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Abstract  
 
This paper examines the issue of perceived value generated by the assignment of financial value to 
intangibles in financial reporting.  In particular, values assigned to goodwill and other intangibles in 
mergers and acquisitions are examined, and the impact of such intangible valuations as a potential 
misperception/misdirection as to true underlying entity value is examined. 
 
Keywords:  Accounting Principles Board (APB), Accounting Standards Codification (ASC), American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), fair 
market value (FMV), goodwill, Gordian Knot, growth, impairment, intangibles, market share, mergers 
and acquisitions (M&A), profits, profit maximization, U.S. Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), 
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_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 I. Introduction 
 
 Under the U.S. Financial Accounting Standards Board‘s (FASB‘s) standards today, 
its Accounting Standards Codification (ASC) rules provide significant leewayas to the 
values assigned to net assets acquired, particularly evident in mergers and acquisitions 
concerning the values assigned to intangibles, in particular goodwill.  Additionally, 
under the current standards, the wasting of those intangible asset values as expenses, 
provide wide discretion as to how such assets are valued and when they are expensed.   
 
      Previously, one of the largest categories of intangibles, ‗goodwill‘, was to be 
amortized (expensed) over a period of time for which the asset provided benefits to the 
enterprise, but not to exceed 40 years.  This method of dealing with goodwill was 
established by American Institute of Certified Public Accountants‘ (AICPA‘s) Accounting 
Principles Board in (APB) 17, Intangible Assets, August 1970.  This rule established a 
systematic and rational basis for dealing with the expensing of intangibles including 
goodwill, which narrowed the amount of discretion executives had; specifically, the 
method and the number of years over which intangibles would be expensed.  The APB 
17 standard provided the basis for an annual charge against intangible assets that 
appeared in the Income Statement as an expense, similar to the depreciation of a 
physical asset, which represented the diminishment of asset value in a systematic and 
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rational process. Thus, annual expensing of these intangible assets introduced 
constraints on discretion in applying the prudence and conservatism principles of 
accounting fundamentals at the time. 
 However today, the body that became the Accounting Standards Board‘s 
successor, The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), has elected to follow a 
looser ‗unless and until‘ impairment standard regarding intangibles.  Superseding APB 
17, Statement of Financial Accounting Standard (SFAS) 142, ‗Goodwill and Other 
Intangible Assets,‘ June 2001, required the use of the impairment charge method of 
expensing intangibles including Goodwill.  That is, goodwill was not to be systematically 
and rationally amortized anymore; rather, it was to henceforth be ‗impaired‘, if and 
when impairment occurred.  That is, intangibles were not to be expensed unless and 
until impairment occurred – a value as principally determined in the eye of the beholder 
approach.  U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) are based on its 
standards being systematic and rational, and not subject materially to the whim and 
discretion of executives‘ perceptions, which may sometimes be deemed arbitrary and 
capricious. The ‗impairment rule‘ in use today is still the rule under the FASB‘s SFAS 
142as codified in its Accounting Standards Codification (ASC)  as FASB Accounting 
Standards Update (ASU) 2012-02, issued July 2012, Topic 350. 
 
 Other intangibles of note that are subject to the same treatment today as 
goodwill are represented by intangible assets such as: customer lists, brand names, 
intellectual property, etc.  As each intangible asset is unique, the fundamental problem 
lies in valuing (few to no benchmarks are available) and estimating a useful life.  This 
issue ultimately becomes a discretionary judgment call by enterprise executives.  The 
previous APB 17 rule mitigated to a large degree the discretion in the expensing of such 
assets. 
 
 II. Intangibles 
 
 General intangibles are defined in the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C) in 
Article 9 - Definitions, as: 
 any personal property that is not an account, chattel paper, commercial tort 
claim, deposit account, document, instrument, goods, investment property, letter-of-
credit right, letter of credit, money, or mineral before extraction especially as identified 
by section 9-102 of the Uniform Commercial Code (n.d).   
 
 More specifically and simply, intangibles are assets which have the following 
characteristics: ―incapable of being perceived by touch; impalpable, are imprecise or 
unclear to the mind, or are saleable, though not possessing intrinsic productive value‖ 
(The Free Dictionary, n.d.)  
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 FASB under its accounting authority, specifically in its Accounting Standards 
Codification (ASC) governing the accounting for intangibles and goodwill, sections 350-
10, 350-20 and subtopic 850-30, addresses the issues of, and issues associated with, 
intangibles including goodwill.  In particular, paragraph ASC 350-10-05-1 provides 
guidance on financial accounting and reporting related to goodwill. Paragraph ASC 850-
30-30-1) Measurement of Goodwill, posits: 
 
 …the acquirer shall recognize goodwill as of the acquisition date, measured as 
the excess of (a) over (b) where (a) is the aggregate of the consideration transferred; 
the fair value of any non controlling interest in the acquired; the business combination 
achieved in stages and (b) is the net of the acquisition-date amounts of the identifiable 
assets acquired and the liabilities assumed measured in accordance with this Topic. 
 
 The Accounting Standard Codification (ASC 350-10-20) also describes 
Goodwill,―…as an asset representing the future economic benefits arising from other 
assets acquired in a business combination or an acquisition by a not-for-profit entity 
that are not individually identified and separately recognized.‖ 
 
       In simple terms, goodwill is generally a long term asset of an intangible nature 
that arises when a company acquires another business in its entirety.  Goodwill is 
calculated as follows: 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Even more simply, goodwill is the net asset value of assets acquired in excess of 
their Fair Market Value that cannot be individually identified. 
 
 
  
  
Figure 1: Intangibles - The Goodwill Calculation 
 
Cost of the Acquisition 
-Fair Market Value (FMV) of Tangible Assets Acquired 
                     - FMV Value of Intangible Assets Acquired Individually Identifiable 
                     - Value of Assumed Liabilities of the Entity Acquired 
                     =Goodwill 
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 III. Facts and Historical Points – The Rules 
 
 Many of the issues in dealing with intangibles including good will arose when the 
former Accounting Principles Board (predecessor to the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board – FASB) in its Opinion, APB No. 16, ‗Business Combinations‘, permitted two 
methods of accounting for acquisitions: 1) the purchase acquisition rule where goodwill 
had to be calculated, and 2) the pooling acquisition rule which permitted firms to simply 
merge like kind account balances (no write-up of asset values to fair market value).  
APB 16 required the pooling method to be used, but then laid out a series of rules 
which were difficult for firms to meet in adopting the pooling method.  Unless all the 
pooling combination rules could be met, the purchase method had to be used. The 
effect was many firms had to use the purchase method for business combinations.  APB 
No. 16 was superseded with the FASB issuance of its Statement No. 141 (SFAS 141), 
‗Business Combinations‘, which only permitted the purchase method to be used for 
accounting for business acquisitions.  To date, the purchase method of accounting for 
business combinations stands. 
 
       Additionally, FASB Concepts Statement 2 (CON 2), (May 1990), Qualitative 
Characteristics of Accounting Information, in paragraphs 91 – 93, addresses the matter 
of making the conservative choice when deciding accounting matters. 
 
 91. Nothing has yet been said about conservatism, a convention that many 
accountants believe to be appropriate in making accounting decisions. To quote APB 
Statement 4: Frequently, assets and liabilities are measured in a context of significant 
uncertainties. Historically, managers, investors, and accountants have generally 
preferred that possible errors in measurement be in the direction of understatement 
rather than overstatement of net income and net assets. 
This has led to the convention of conservatism. . . . [paragraph 171] 
 
 92. There is a place for a convention such as conservatism—meaning prudence—
in financial accounting and reporting, because business and economic activities are 
surrounded by uncertainty, but it needs to be applied with care. Since a preference 
―that possible errors in measurement be in the direction of understatement rather than 
overstatement of net income and net assets‖ introduces a bias into financial reporting, 
conservatism tends to conflict with significant qualitative characteristics, such as 
representational faithfulness, neutrality, and comparability (including consistency). To 
be clear about what conservatism does not mean may often be as important as to be 
clear about what it means. 
 
 93. Conservatism in financial reporting should no longer connote deliberate, 
consistent understatement of net assets and profits. The Board emphasizes that point 
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because conservatism has long been identified with the idea that deliberate 
understatement is a virtue. That notion became deeply ingrained and is still in evidence 
despite efforts over the past 40 years to change it. The convention of conservatism, 
which was once commonly expressed in the admonition to ―anticipate no profits but 
anticipate all losses,‖ developed during a time when balance sheets were considered 
the primary (and often only) financial statement, and details of profits or other 
operating results were rarely provided outside business enterprises. To the bankers or 
other lenders who were the principal external users of financial statements, 
understatement for its own sake became widely considered to be desirable, since the 
greater the understatement of assets the greater the margin of safety the assets 
provided as security for loans or other debts. 
 
 However, the FASB with its issuance of SFAC 8, September 8, 2010, ‗Qualitative 
Characteristics of Accounting Information‘ which superseded CON 2, changed its long 
standing practice of a preference for the conservative choice.  In Para BC3.27 of SFAS 8 
(also referred to as CON 8), the FASB no longer included ‘prudence or conservatism’ as 
an aspect of neutrality. Hence, the new …unless and until… impairment treatment for 
Intangibles and Goodwill became the standard in place ‗til today. 
 
 
 IV. Discussion of the Issues 
 
 In the recent past, it was noted in Forbes Magazine (Oct. 16, 2006), when 
reviewing the new, at the time,  FASB‘s Fair Value Reporting Standard, SFAS 157, Fair 
Value Measurements, September 2006 (now re-classed as FASB ASC 820, Fair Value 
Measurements and Disclosures), that large issues loomed regarding intangibles and 
their valuations.  Here, Forbes reported that Verizon Corporation carried on its books 
approximately $48 billion in wireless license fees paid to the FCC for spectrum.  The 
issue arose when the FCC subsequently auctioned off twice as much spectrum as 
Verizon held for approximately $14 billion.   By dividing the $14 billion by 2, we can see 
the FCC auctioned off approximately the same amount of spectrum as Verizon held for 
$7 billion – a $41 billion delta from what appeared on Verizon‘s books paid for licenses.  
Here Verizon would likely have had to show this was not a market comparable (marked 
to market) – our spectrum is different than the recently auctioned off FCC spectrum, 
and use the fall back value method of justifying its spectrum value with a net present 
value discounted cash flow estimation based on the spectrum held.  But $41 billion is 
$41 billion on anyone‘s books, and represents a huge delta from a marked to market 
basis! 
 
 In more recent times, we see a tremendous growth in the appearance of 
intangibles on the balance sheets of many companies in order to show top line and 
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bottom line growth in an otherwise satiated market.  That is, when few green fields 
remain (few unclaimed customers), entities start buying others to feed Wall Street‘s 
need to see top and bottom line growth period over period in order to sustain market 
values.  Such acquisitions in periods where margin and growth without acquisitions are 
being squeezed tend to drive managements to find a way to show material top and 
bottom line growth other than via organic growth.  Unfortunately, in such acquisitions, 
material layoffs often follow in order to capture accretive financial benefits. 
 
 Such acquisitions then often result in material goodwill and other intangibles 
(values placed on customer lists for example) appearing on the balance sheet as a 
percent of total assets and/or off balance sheet market values.  It was reported in The 
Wall Street Journal that companies in the U.S. could have recorded more than $8 
trillion in intangible assets (including goodwill) according to Leonard Nakamura of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia (2016).  Monga states, ―… that‘s nearly half of the 
combined $17.9 trillion market capitalization of the S&P 500 index (Monga 
2016).Bernard Condon of Associated Press (2016) indicates that goodwill on the 
balance sheets of the Standard & Poor‘s 500 index ballooned to $2.5 trillion.  ―That is 
50% more than at the end of the last deal boom in 2007 according toFactSet,‖ 
(Condon, 2016).   
 
 The effect of the move to booking large goodwill amounts according to data 
provided by R.G. Associates, a research firm that focuses on accounting matters, shows 
that in 2002 following a surge in acquisitions, accounting write-downs cut pre-tax 
earnings by 21%, while goodwill write downs in the twelve months following the end of 
2007 reduced S&P 500 earnings by more than 38% (Condon, 2016). 
 
  Condon further identifies the issues with goodwill values.  He posits that the 
average premium over market prices offered by acquirers in 2015 was 38%, and for 
health care companies, the premium offered was 57% (Condon, 2016).  To some, such 
premiums over market value appear as gross overpayments above what the market 
reflected as value. 
 
 The below Figure2 presents reported Intangibles including Goodwill of 19 of the 
largest U.S. publicly listed companies with the largest goodwill.  This table also presents 
a view of intangibles and goodwill relative to each entities total assets and market 
capitalization measures. 
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Figure 2: Total Assets, Market Caps, Goodwill and Intangibles 
  
Total Assets, Market Caps,  Goodwill, and Intangibles 
            
 
(in Billions of $s  rounded to nearest Whole Billion for, Years ending in 2015-months vary) 
  
 
Sources: Forbes Magazine, June 15, 2016, www.sec.gov/edgar), & Siblis Research 
  
  
Largest 25 U.S. Firms by Goodwill and Other Intangibles  
(Excluding Financial Institutions) Sorted by Goodwill as a % of Assets 
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Express 
Script 
Holding ESRX December  53 59 29 55 10 39 78 
Time 
Warner TWX December 64 52 28 43 8 36 70 
CVS 
Health CVS December 94 108 38 40 14 52 49 
United 
Health 
Group UNH December 111 112 44 40 8 52 47 
Procter 
& 
Gamble PG June  130 221 45 37 25 70 32 
General 
Dynami
cs GD December 32 43 11 36 1 12 30 
Mondel
ez 
Interna
tional MDLZ December  63 71 21 33 19 40 57 
Honey
well 
interna
tional HON December 49 80 16 32 5 21 26 
Walt 
Disney DIS October 88 174 28 32 7 35 20 
United 
Technol
ogies UTX December 88 85 27 31 16 43 51 
HP HPQ October 107 21 33 31 2 35 167* 
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Oracle ORCL May 111 156 34 31 6 40 26 
Tyson 
Foods TSN October 23 16 7 29 5 12 75 
IBM IBM December 111 134 32 29 3 35 26 
Pfizer PFE December 168 199 48 29 40 88 44 
Anthe
m ANTM December 62 36 18 29 8 26 72 
3M MMM December  33 93 9 28 3 12 13 
Lockhe
ed 
Martin LMT December 49 67 14 28 4 18 27 
AT&T T December 403 212 105 26 121 226 106 
   *Note: HP’s numbers above are distorted due to the breakup of HP into two separate enterprises in this period.  
 As an example of the growing issue regarding the size of intangibles on balance 
sheets, viewing one large firm in the table above which has been in the news of late, 
AT&T, it can be seen AT&T had total assets of approximately $403 billion, and goodwill 
of approximately $105 billion (by far the largest goodwill dollar amount amongst the 
firms examined) for the year 2015.  It is noted that this goodwill sum grew by 
approximately $31 billion in just one year alone – principally because of AT&T‘s DirecTV 
acquisition.  Moreover, it had other intangibles of $121 billion for a total intangibles 
amount of approximately $226 billion, or 106% of its December 31, 2015 market 
capitalization, representing approximately 56% of total assets. If we subtract 
intangibles from total assets ($403 billion - $226 Billion = $180 billion) we see 
intangibles comprised approximately 126% of other assets.  AT&T‘s total intangibles 
alone exceeded its market capitalization by approximately $14 billion.  Compare that 
goodwill amount ($105 Billion) above to the former AT&T‘s approximately $2 billion in 
goodwill on approximately $60 billion in assets in its December 1998 annual report to 
shareholders, and we see an explosive expansion in intangible values.One analyst 
estimates with the Time Warner acquisition, AT&T‘s debt will increase from $119 billion 
in 2016 to $170 billion (Knutson, 2016). Something has dramatically changed, perhaps 
in part because of the change in business combination and impairment standards 
regarding intangibles today. 
 And recently in 2016, AT&T announced its planned acquisition of Time Warner for 
approximately $108.7 billion -$85.4 billion in cash and stock with the remainder indebt 
assumption (Hagey, et al, 2016).  One can only imagine how much intangible ‗value‘ 
will be added to AT&T‘s balance sheet after Time Warner‘s net assets are written up to 
fair market value.   
 
 However, this acquisition also raises another important matter regarding 
intangible values.  Most of AT&T‘s DirecTV‘s customer base pays at the high end of the 
pricing spectrum for television and cable like programming subscription services – an 
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average of $117 a month (Gryta, 2016). AT&T has announced plans to offer 
DirecTVNow services based principally on Time Warner‘s programming content via 
streaming Internet services for $35 a month, initially for 100 channels with a free Apple 
TV provided. Premium services are estimated to be priced at $50 to $60 per month 
when available (Gryta, 2016).  This begs the question, how many customers will 
migrate away from AT&T‘s higher priced DirecTV to its new lower priced DirecTVNow 
services?  And what will such migration to AT&T‘s DirecTVNow (or competitor services 
from the likes of Netflix, Hulu, SlingTV, et al) do to the supposed value gained in the 
DirecTV acquisition of just over one year ago?  Will not this DirecTVNow offering along 
with like kind competitive offerings materially and negatively impact the value of AT&T 
intangibles? 
 
 As an asset, goodwill appears to help the acquirer in a business combination in 
sustaining the appearance of increasing enterprise value via increased assets, and in 
the firm‘s ability to show top and bottom line increases through additional revenues 
with no concomitant penalty in the form of additional expenses (goodwill and other 
intangible asset impairment/expenses).  What develops is a pattern of constraints 
wherein a primary, almost single focus on sustained growth and profit maximization 
ultimately leads to entity non-sustainability by placing gross overpayments for assets 
above net asset fair market values on the balance sheet. That is, long term 
sustainability may be negatively impacted in entities that pay large premiums over 
market values for net assets acquired above fair market value by showing such 
overpayments as assets versus period or transaction expenses.  In concept, it could be 
said that managements and Boards of Directors are induced to grossly overpay for net 
assets acquired because there are material gains: enhanced enterprise valuations, 
positive stock price performance, an increased ability to borrow or raise other capital, 
and an ability to reward managers and employees with ever increasing ‗in the money‘ 
options, etc.  But the question remains, do such overpayments above market values 
enhance or limit sustainability? 
 
 Monga (2016) in The Wall Street Journal cites the work of economist Carol 
Corrado.  Corrado shows that companies were investing approximately 14% of the 
private sector gross domestic product into non-physical assets (intangibles) in 2014.  
The investment in tangible assets (physical matter) in 2014 was approximately 10%.  
Corrado posits this was a reverse of the situation of 40 years ago where investment in 
tangible assets was 13%, and intangibles was 9%.Clearly technological advancements 
have had an impact in the type of investments made; but 40 years ago, intangibles 
including goodwill had to be systematically amortized (expensed) over not more than 
40 years – a dramatic difference with the intangible‘s impairment (expense) standards 
of today. 
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 Possible Reasons for the Growth in Intangibles including Goodwill 
 
 Why might managements see the gross over payment above fair market value 
for net assets acquired as a tool of value – and top and bottom line enhancements?  
Simply, when in the second half of the life cycle in any industry, it becomes harder and 
harder to capture new un-captured customers.  Hence growing a top and bottom line 
via organic growth becomes much more arduous than in the first half of the respective 
business life cycle.  And, as Wall Street principally only rewards top and bottom line 
growth and market share gains period over period, firms in maturing markets need to 
show growth and increases in the top line and bottom lines above all else.  And with 
intangibles not having to be systematically expensed, managements have a window of 
opportunity to drive for the brass ring – top line and bottom line growth, with no 
concurrent material acquisition overpayment expenses appearing on the income 
statement.  This possible willingness to grossly overpay for net assets acquired above 
fair market value is even more likely so if CEO and CFO tenures are examined.  Fortune 
Magazine reported that for the 500 largest companies in the U.S., the mean tenure for 
a CEOis 4.9 years (Sonnenfeld, 2015), and for CFOs, The Wall Street Journal reported 
the mean tenure was 5.6 years (Monga, 2015).  Hardly a tenure long enough to worry 
about sustainability and the long term! 
 
 In the market as a function of time, if a primary focus on profit maximization is 
followed driven by an understanding of mean tenure times for senior officers, it almost 
universally will lead to corporate decline or demise – short term growth and profit 
maximization versus longer term sustainability strategies and actions. 
 
 And if we consider the short life cycles of a business enterprises averaging 12.5 
years (Shore, 2013), here too we see relatively very short lives as in the mean tenure 
times of the CEO and CFO.  Strong incentives for immediate gratification. 
 
 Conclusions and Recommendations  
 
 More assets on balance sheets today are of an intangible nature (including 
goodwill) than at any previous time.  Clearly, technological changes may be at the 
center of this shift in asset form, but it also appears that accounting standards have 
created a large inducement for companies to ‗puff the value wares‘ by permitting for an 
overpaying (premiums above market value) for net assets acquired in a business 
combination without such goodwill and other intangible assets being systematically 
amortized (expensed).   
 
      Inasmuch as the impairment standards still provide wide discretion in their 
calculation even in the latest FASB draft regarding the impairment of intangibles, in 
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order to return to the accounting underpinnings of making the prudent and 
conservative choice, the following is recommended: 
 
 Modify the FASB ASC 805 Business Combinations standard (and associated 
standards as needed) such that any premium paid by a successor entity for a business 
in a business combination above the market value as represented on a main stock 
exchange on the day before the proposed acquisition or merger is announced, be 
expensed upon deal closing. This would mitigate the large increases in intangibles 
created under current standards.  And it would highlight how much management paid 
over the net fair market value of net assets acquired. 
 Reintroduce into the Statements of Financial Accounting Concepts (SFACs) the 
prudence and conservatism underpinnings in accounting previously found in FASB‘s 
CON 2. 
 Reintroduce the rational and systemic amortization of intangibles (excluding 
patents and copyrights, etc. if they have a statutory remaining life greater than 20 
years) over a period not to exceed 20 years. 
 
 These recommended changes should help unmask gross overpayments above 
market values seen in business combinations of the past ten years and rationally and 
systematically expense intangibles over a reasonable period of time considering today‘s 
shorter life cycles. 
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